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Abstract
The paper exploits a large set of more than 8,000 ﬁrms for ten ad-
vanced transition countries in order to uncover the importance of diﬀerent
channels of technology transfer through FDI and its impact on productiv-
ity growth of local ﬁrms. In addition to direct eﬀects, we also distinguish
between intra-industry (horizontal) and inter-industry (vertical) spillovers
from foreign owned ﬁrms to local ﬁrms. After correcting for foreign in-
vestment selection bias and controlling for endogeneity of input demand
(using a dynamic system GMM approach), direct FDI eﬀects were found
to provide by far the most important productivity eﬀect for local ﬁrms in
transition countries. Direct eﬀects of FDI are found to provide on aver-
age an impact on ﬁrm’s productivity that is larger by factor 50 than the
impact of backward linkages and by factor 500 larger than the impact of
horizontal spillovers.
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11 Introduction
The channels of international technology transfer and their importance for growth
have been studied extensively in the 1990s. These studies identify three principal
channels of international R&D spillovers. The ﬁrst is a direct transfer of tech-
nology via international licensing agreements (Eaton and Kortum 1996), though
r e c e n t l yt h e s ep r o v i d el e s si m p o r t a n ts o u r c ea st h el a t e s ta n dm o s tv a l u a b l et e c h -
nologies are not available on license (World Investment Report 2000). Second is
foreign direct investments (FDI) that provides probably the most important and
cheapest channel of direct technology transfer as well as indirect, intra-industry
knowledge spillovers to developing countries (Blomström and Kokko 1997). Sev-
eral studies oﬀer empirical evidence on the importance of FDI ﬂows for ﬁrm’s pro-
ductivity growth in developing countries (see Aitken and Harrison 1999, Boren-
sztein, De Gregorio and Lee 1998, Blomström and Sjöholm 1999). Third channel
of technology transfer is through international trade, in particular imports of in-
termediate products and capital equipment (see Markusen 1989, Grossman and
Helpman 1991, Feenstra, Markusen and Zeile 1992) as well as through learning
by exporting into industrial countries (Clerides, Lach and Tybout 1997).
There is quite enormous empirical evidence on positive direct technology
transfer from a multinational corporation (MNC) to its local aﬃliates in terms of
higher productivity levels and growth These studies using ﬁrm level panel data
include developed as well as developing countries (e.g. Haddad and Harrison
1993, Blomström 1994, Blomström and Sjöholm 1999, Aitken and Harrison 1999,
Greenaway and Wakelin 2001, Berry, et. al. 2001, Alverez, et. al. 2002, Blalock
2001, etc.). On the other side, despite the theoretical justiﬁcation of potential
spillovers, the evidence on technology spillovers from a local aﬃliate to its hori-
zontal competitors and/or to its vertically linked suppliers and customers is very
weak or even negative. In an extensive review of the literature, Görg and Green-
away (2001), list three potential reasons for empirical failure of ﬁnding signiﬁcant
spillovers. First, MNCs might be very eﬀective in protecting their technology ad-
vantages and so preventing from potential spillovers. Second reason is that most
of the studies has been carried out at the aggregate or sectoral level, which is
not an appropriate way of looking for spillovers. And third, using cross-section
analysis is clearly less eﬃcient way of accounting for spillovers as compared to
panel data studies. In addition to it, there are several other reasons for failing
to ﬁnd evidence of spillovers. One reason is the poor quality of data and limited
samples of ﬁrms studied. Second reason might be in the short panels of ﬁrms an-
alyzed and/or in hypothesizing a linear relationship between spillovers and local
ﬁrms productivity growth. Yet another reason might be lie in using inappropriate
econometric techniques like simple pooled OLS or static panel data techniques.
Recently, there is also a growing literature on FDI spillovers in transition
countries. However, similarly to the developed and developing countries’ studies,
the existing evidence from Eastern European ﬁrm-level panel data suggests that
2there are few intra-industry spillovers from FDI. Konings (2001) shows that FDI
may be important for transferring technology to an aﬃliate, but provides no
evidence of horizontal spillovers to local ﬁrms in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania
from 1993 to 1997. Instead, there is signiﬁcant evidence of negative spillovers in
Poland. Djankov and Hoekman (2000) also provide evidence of negative spillovers
and suggest that there may not even have been much technology transfer to the
foreign aﬃliates in the Czech Republic from 1992 to 1996. Kinoshita (2000)
provides evidence of spillovers in the Czech Republic from 1995 to 1998, but they
are limited to ﬁrms engaged in R&D or in the production of electrical equipment.
Damijan and Knell (2002) study the impact of diﬀerent privatization methods
on the accessibility of international knowledge spillovers by local ﬁrms. They
ﬁnd that ﬁrms in Estonia, who underwent privatization process that was very
open to foreign capital, gain signiﬁcant direct technology transfer through FDI,
while ﬁrms in Slovenia, mainly privatized to local funds as well as to insiders (i.e.
employees and managers), are constrained to access to international knowledge
spillovers mainly through international trade ﬂows. Damijan et al (2001) provide
a study on eight transition countries using static panel data approach and also
fail to ﬁnd support for intra-industry spillovers. More recently, several studies
(e.g. Schoors and van der Tool 2001, Smarzynska 2002, and Smarzynska and
Spatareanu 2002) ﬁnd evidence of inter-industry spillovers from FDI for individual
transition countries.
These previous studies on transition economies provide a useful insight into
the eﬀects of international R&D spillovers at the ﬁrm level, but due to heteroge-
nous methodology used they remain merely case studies. The main objective of
this paper therefore is to provide a comparative study on importance of spillovers
through FDI on a set of comparable countries by using a common methodology
and up-to-date dynamic panel data techniques. This is the way how to achieve
comparability of the results and to provide a credible insight into the importance
of diﬀerent channels of international technology transfer for ﬁrms in transition
countries. In order to do this, the study diﬀerentiate between direct eﬀects of
FDI from the parent ﬁrm to local aﬃliates as well as horizontal vertical spillovers
from foreign aﬃliates to domestically owned local ﬁrms. To calculate horizon-
tal and vertical spillovers and to diﬀerentiate between backward and forward
vertical linkages we use the methodology developed by Blalock (2001) and Dami-
jan and Knell (2002). The importance of these diﬀerent channels of technology
transfer is then estimated in the framework of growth accounting approach using
the unique ﬁrm level database consisting of some 8,000 ﬁrms for ten advanced
transition countries in the period 1995-1999. Due to the simultanenity prob-
lem that typically arises in growth accounting approach estimated in the panel
data framework, we make use of the recently developed econometric methods
for dealing with dynamic panel data. Hence, we estimate augmented production
function at the ﬁrm level using system general method of moments (sys-GMM)
approach. In addition, we correct for potential selection bias that arises due to
3possibly endogenous foreign investment decisions using a generalized Heckman
two-step procedure. We ﬁnd that direct FDI eﬀects are signiﬁcant in ﬁve out of
ten examined transition countries and that they provide by far the most impor-
tant productivity spillover for local ﬁrms. On the other hand, in three countries
where signiﬁcant vertical spillovers are detected, the impact of backward verti-
cal spillovers is found to be higher by factor 10 relative to horizontal spillovers.
These results speak in favor of the larger importance of vertical versus horizontal
spillovers from FDI.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses sources of productivity
growth in the global economy and developes theoretical model that allows for
accounting diﬀerent measures of spillovers at the ﬁrm level. Section 3 describes
data and econometric approach employed. Section 4 discusses the results and
ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Channels of technology transfer through FDI
There are many ways an ﬁrm can acquire new technology besides its own invest-
ments into R&D capital. Despite trade, FDI is potentially the most important
international vehicle of technology transfer for ﬁrms. This source of productivity
growth has been particularly important for ﬁrms in transition economies because
of the urgent need to restructure quickly. Foreign ownership often provides local
ﬁrms with eﬃcient corporate governance, as they, mainly privatized to insid-
ers, do not have incentives to restructure (Blanchard 1997). FDI may also be
the cheapest means of technology transfer, as the recipient ﬁrm normally does
not have to ﬁnance the acquisition of new technology. And it tends to transfer
newer technology more quickly than licensing agreements and international trade
(Mansﬁe l da n dR o m e o1 9 8 0 ) . A n ds i n c ei th a sam o r ed i r e c te ﬀect on the eﬃ-
ciency of ﬁrms, it also has the potential to create positive spillover eﬀects to local
ﬁrms.
Technology spillovers through FDI can occur between ﬁrms that are vertically
integrated with the MNC (inter-industry spillovers) or in direct competition with
it (intra-industry spillovers). Kokko (1992) identiﬁes at least four ways that tech-
nology might be diﬀused from foreign investment enterprise (FIE) to other ﬁrms
in the economy: (1) demonstration - imitation eﬀect, (2) competition eﬀect, (3)
foreign linkage eﬀect, and (4) training eﬀect. Not all spillovers are positive as FDI
can generate negative externalities when foreign ﬁrms with superior technology
force domestic ﬁrms to exit. These negative externalities are often called also
competition eﬀect, crowding-out eﬀect or business-stealing eﬀect.
Recent analyses of importance of technology transfer and spillovers through
FDI are typically carried out using ﬁrm panel data. As mentioned above, the
evidence provides support for direct technology transfer from MNCs to their af-
ﬁliates, while there is only a weak evidence of spillovers to indigenous ﬁrms.
4However, with the very recent exceptions of Blalock (2001), Schoors and van der
Tool (2001), Smarzynska (2002) and Smarzynska and Spatareanu (2002), all of
the studies have focused on intra-industry spillovers. Aitken and Harrison (1999)
show signiﬁcant technology transfer to the aﬃliates and some positive spillovers
to domestic ﬁrms in Venezuela located close to the aﬃliate, but there were also
negative spillovers to the domestic economy as a whole. There was some pos-
itive spillovers in other developing countries, but these were limited to certain
industries, such as those with relatively simple technology in Morocco (Haddad
and Harrison 1993), are export oriented as in Indonesia (Blomström and Sjöholm
1999), or have suﬃcient human capital as in Uruguay (Blomström 1994). Ear-
lier studies that did not use panel data often found evidence of intra-industry
spillovers. These include a study by Caves (1974) of Australian manufacturing in
1966, a study by Globerman (1979) of Canadian industry in 1972 and studies of
Mexico in the mid-1970s by Blomström and Persson (1983) and the mid-1980s by
Blomström and Wolﬀ (1994). However, a study of US ﬁrms in Europe shown that
spillovers were localized and that competition forced many local competitors out
of small markets (Cantwell, 1989). Recent analyses of panel data for advanced
countries provide little or no evidence of spillovers in the 1990s. Girma, Green-
away and Wakelin (2001) provide evidence for the United Kingdom, (Berry, et.
al. (2001), for Ireland, and Alverez, et. al. (2002) for Spain. There was also
some evidence of negative spillovers in Ireland.
On the other hand, empirical evidence (Kokko 1994, Borensztein, De Gregorio
and Lee 1998, and Kinoshita 2000) demonstrate that FDI can contribute to over-
all domestic productivity growth only when technology gap between domestic and
foreign ﬁrms is not too large and when a suﬃcient absorptive capacity is available
in domestic ﬁrms. In other words, technology spillovers from MNCs tend to occur
more frequently when the social capabilities of the host country and the absorp-
tive capacity of the ﬁrms in the economy are high. While relatively backward
countries have a certain advantage in catching-up, it becomes increasingly more
diﬃcult for the country to build the necessary social capabilities and absorptive
capacities that allow ﬁrms to take advantage of the technology spillovers that
are available in the economy. For this reason, R&D can be thought of as having
two complementary eﬀects on ﬁrm’s productivity growth (Cohen and Levinthal
1989). First, R&D directly expands ﬁrm’s technology level by new innovations,
which is called innovation eﬀect. On the other hand, it increases ﬁrm’s absorptive
capacity - ability to identify, assimilate and exploit outside knowledge, which is
usually called learning or absorption eﬀect. These two important eﬀects have to
be included into a serious investigation of spillovers through FDI.
Very recently, empirical studies take explicit account of the vertical spillovers.
Blalock (2001) developes a methodology for calculating backward and forward
linkages between foreign owned ﬁrms and local ﬁrms. He ﬁnds positive vertical
spillovers for Indonesia. Accordingly, Smarzynska (2002) ﬁnds positive backward
spillovers for Lithuania, and Schoors and van der Tool (2001) ﬁnd positive vertical
5spillovers in Hungary. In contrast, Smarzynska and Spatareanu (2002) detect
negative vertical spillovers in Romania. Hence, these studies suggest that vertical
supply chains rather than intra-industry spillovers provide a channel of technology
spillovers between foreign aﬁliates and local ﬁrms.
3 Modeling direct and spillover eﬀects of FDI
As indicated by the above discussion, empirical studies on technology spillovers
should diﬀerentiate between direct eﬀects of FDI as well as horizontal and vertical
spillovers. In the search for horizontal spillovers, one should account for the
technology gap between foreign aﬃliates and local ﬁrms, while the analysis of
vertical spillovers should diﬀerentiate between backward and forward linkages
induced by foreign aﬃliates.
Recent studies on technology transfer and spillovers through FDI are typi-
cally carried out using ﬁrm level panel data. The impact of external technology
spillovers can be measured indirectly in a production function approach by con-
sidering the Sollow residual of output growth as the rate of technological change
after subtracting oﬀ the growth rates of labor and capital. But this residual may
be more a measure of ignorance than a measure of technological accumulation as
Abramovitz (1956) pointed out. An alternative way is to include the technology
variables directly in the production function, a method more reminiscent of the
endogenous growth models developed since the late 1980s. This approach pro-
vides a way to study the various factors that aﬀect productivity growth, including
the technological accumulation. This is done by using the growth accounting ap-
proach and decomposing total factor productivity (TFP) into factors internal
and external to the ﬁrm, such as R&D activity, human capital and channels of
technology transfer.
Following Basu and Fernald (1995), we assume each ﬁrm has a production
function for gross output:
Yit = H
i
³
K
α
it,L
β
it,N
γ
it,T it
´
,( 1 )
where Yitis gross output in ﬁrm i at time t,a n dKit, Lit, Nit,a n dTit represent
the capital stock, the number of employees, materials used in production, and
technology, respectively. The production function (1) is homogenous of degree r
in K, L and N,s u c ht h a tr = α + β + γ 6=1 , which implies that Hi may have
non-constant returns to scale. We include materials used in production because of
measurement problems in K, which, typically for former socialist countries, arise
due to the poor accounting standards and the tendency to understate the value
of capital due to the management and worker buy-out methods of privatization.
Diﬀerentiating equation (1) with respect to time, we get:
yit = αkit + βlit + γnit + tit (2)
6where small letter variables indicate logarithmic growth rates of K, L, N and T,
and α, β and γ represent the elasticity of output with respect to k, l and n.W e
assume that technology shock t is a function of internal technology variables Git
and of various spillover eﬀects Zit:
tit = f
i (Git,Zit) (3)
where
Fi,M i,RD it ∈ Git
ESit,HS it,VS
B
it,EX it,IM it ∈ Zit.
where the elements of Git are foreign ownership Fi, majority foreign ownership
Mi, and internal R&D expenditures (RDit)o faﬁrm. Zit consists of potential
home market spillovers (external economies of scale at the industry level) ESit,
horizontal spillovers HSit and of vertical backward spillovers VS B
it as well as of
global knowledge spillovers through international trade (EXit and IMit stand for
ﬁrm’s exports and imports, respectively).
The basic idea underlying equation (3) is that individual ﬁrm can boost its
technology level either internally through appropriate ownership structure and
own investments into R&D and/or by relying on external sources of knowledge
spillovers, such as home market spillovers, horizontal and vertical spillovers from
aﬃliates of MNC’s as well as learning-by-exporting and imports of capital and
intermediate goods.
Regarding the impact of FDI, MNC’s can transfer newer technology and or-
ganizational skills both directly to the aﬃliate, and indirectly to other ﬁrms in
the host economy. On one hand, direct eﬀects generally appear to aﬃliates as
changes in productivity (shown in Hi) and in better utilization of existing inputs
(accounted directly in foreign aﬃliates by introducing interaction terms Fitkit,
Fitlit and Fitnit into model (2)). Presence of an aﬃliate, on the other hand, can
also increase the rate of technical change and technological learning in the econ-
omy indirectly through knowledge spillovers to local ﬁrms. Knowledge spillovers
occur as a consequence of aﬃliate introducing new technologies and organiza-
tional skills that are typically better than in the local ﬁrms. The innovation
system and social capabilities of the host economy, together with the absorptive
capacity of other ﬁrms in the host economy measured by own R&D investments
(RDit), will then determine the pace of technological progress in the economy as
aw h o l e .
Knowledge spillovers can occur between ﬁrms that are vertically integrated
with the foreign aﬃliate (inter-industry spillovers) or in direct competition with
it (intra-industry spillovers). Kokko (1992) and Perez (1998) describe at least ﬁve
ways how knowledge spillovers from foreign aﬃliates can increase technical change
and technological learning. First, competition with the foreign aﬃliate can in-
crease intra-industry spillovers by stimulating technical change and technological
7learning. Greater competitive pressure faced by local ﬁrms induces them to in-
troduce new products to defend their market share and adopt new management
methods to increase productivity. This kind of spillover, known as “competition
eﬀect”, is most important in industries with relatively low actual and potential
competition and high barriers to entry. Second, cooperation between foreign af-
ﬁliates and upstream suppliers and downstream customers increases knowledge
spillovers (vertical spillovers). To improve the quality standards of their suppliers,
foreign aﬃliates often provide resources to improve the technological capabilities
of both vertically and horizontally linked ﬁrms. Third, human capital can spill
over from foreign aﬃliates to other ﬁr m sa ss k i l l e dl a b o rm o v e sb e t w e e ne m p l o y -
ers. These spillovers are especially important for ﬁrms that lack the technological
capabilities and managerial skills to compete in world markets. Fourth, the prox-
imity of local ﬁrms to foreign aﬃliates can sometimes lead to demonstration or
imitation spillovers. When foreign aﬃliates introduce new products, processes
and organizational forms, they provide a demonstration of increased eﬃciency to
other local ﬁrms. Local ﬁrms may also imitate foreign aﬃliates through reverse
engineering, personal contact and industrial espionage. Finally, a concentration
of related industrial activities may also encourage the formation of industrial
clusters, which further encourage FDI and local spillovers.
Although there are clear diﬀerences between these types of knowledge spillovers,
the empirical literature captures mainly those occurring between ﬁrms within the
industry. The reason is that competitive eﬀects within an industry are much
easier to measure than linkage eﬀects across industries. Studies that estimate
spillover eﬀects using the production function approach similar to the one spec-
iﬁed in equation (1) unintentionally pick up inter-industry eﬀects contained in
the variables Y and N. But with exception of Blalock (2001), Schoors and van
der Tool (2001), and Smarzynska (2002), all of the panel data analyses on the
eﬀect of knowledge spillovers on productivity growth consider only intra-industry
eﬀects. In the present study we follow Blalock (2001) and slightly modify his
methodology in order to capture these inter-industry eﬀects by incorporating di-
rect requirements coeﬃcients derived from the input-output accounts from each
country into the empirical model.
To disentangle the two spillover eﬀects, we deﬁne the scope for intra-industry
spillovers, or horizontal spillovers, as the share of an industry’s output produced
by the foreign aﬃliates:
HSkt =
Pn
i=1 FAikt Pn,m
i=1(FAikt + DFjkt)
(4)
i =1 ,...,n, j =1 ,...,m
where HSkt is horizontal spillovers in industry k in period t, FAikt is output of
foreign aﬃliate i in industry k and period t,a n dDFjkt is output of domestic
ﬁrm j in industry k and period t. These spillovers reﬂect mainly the competitive
8pressures that encourage local ﬁrms to introduce new products to defend their
m a r k e ts h a r ea n da d o p tn e wm a n a g e m e n tm e t h o d st oi n c r e a s ep r o d u c t i v i t y .I m -
itation, reverse engineering, personal contact and industrial espionage may also
be captured by this variable. However, exports often comprise a large proportion
of the output of foreign aﬃliates, reducing the impact they might have had on
the domestic market. To compensate for this reduction of competitive pressures
in the domestic market, we correct the measure of horizontal spillovers in (4) by
the share of exports of foreign aﬃliates EXikt in their total output Yikt:
HSkt =
Pn
i=1 FAikt Pn,m
i=1(FAikt + DFjkt)
∗
µ
1 −
n P
i=1
EXikt
Yikt
¶
(5)
In the next step we account for potential vertical spillovers of foreign aﬃliates,
i.e. for the impact of foreign aﬃliates on their upstream suppliers.1 Foreign
aﬃliates often provide resources to improve the technological capabilities and
quality standards of their upstream suppliers. We account for these backward
linkages VS B
kt as a sum of output of industries r purchased by ﬁrms in the industry
k weighted by the share of total foreign output HSkt:
VS
B
kt =
p P
r,k=1
(αkrt ∗ HSkt) (6)
r,k =1 ,...,p,
where αkrt (0 ≤ αkrt ≤ 1) is the proportion of industry’s r output consumed by
industry k. These direct input requirements are obtained from the input-output
accounts. Again, foreign aﬃliates tend to purchase a larger proportion of their
inputs abroad than domestic ﬁrms, hence reducing the actual demand for home
intermediate goods. Therefore, the measure of backward linkages in (6) should
be corrected by the foreign aﬃliates’ import share:
VS
B
kt =
p P
r,k=1
µ
αkrt ∗ HSkt ∗
µ
1 −
n P
i=1
IMikt
MCikt
¶¶
(7)
where IMikt and MCikt are imports and material costs of foreign aﬃliate i.
It is important to note that not all spillovers are positive. The parent ﬁrm
can also have a negative impact on the direct transfer of technology to its aﬃliate
and reduce the knowledge spillovers to the local economy. For example, MNC’s
can provide their aﬃliates with too few, or the wrong kind of technological capa-
bilities, or even limit access to the technology of the parent company. This type
1In this paper we account for backward linkages only, i.e. for the impact of foreign aﬃliates
on their upstream suppliers. Similarly, foreign aﬃliates can also provide technical assistance
to their downstream customers. However, as foreign aﬃliates are mainly engaged in end-user
consumer goods, these forward linkages are quite low. This is the reason why we neglect this
issue in the present study.
9of behaviour may restrict the production of its aﬃliate to low-value activities and
can also reduce the scope for technical change and technological learning both
within the aﬃliate and as spillovers to the domestic economy. Even if the parent
ﬁrm transfers new technology to its aﬃliate, it can reduce the scope for knowl-
edge spillovers by limiting downstream producers to low value added activities
or eliminate them altogether by relying on foreign suppliers (including itself) for
higher value added intermediate products. Domestic ﬁrms that don’t have the
capability to adapt can also be crowded-out of the market. Bardham (1998) also
suggests that the parent company can restrict domestic production when they
set up aﬃliates with the main purpose of protecting existing property rights and
taking out patents in the host country.
4 Data and econometric approach
4.1 Data
Data at the ﬁrm level provide the best way to test for productivity spillovers.
In order to analyze the importance of diﬀerent channels of technology transfer
in a comparative way we gathered panel data for ten most advanced transition
economies. The data on balance sheets and ﬁnancial statements were collected for
the period 1995-1999 for most of the countries, while for Estonia and Slovenia the
database is for the period 1994-1998 and 1994-1999, respectively. For Estonia and
Slovenia data were obtained from local Statistical oﬃces, while for other transition
countries source of data is the Amadeus database. Our database consists of
manufacturing ﬁrms with more than 100 employees (for Slovenia the lowest bound
of 10 employees is applied). Data on labor enters our estimations as a number of
employees, which is calculated from eﬀective hours worked, while data on sales,
capital and intermediates is taken in local currencies. Capital data were deﬂated
using GDP deﬂators, while data on sales and intermediates were deﬂated using
NACE-2 digit producer price indices for each country. We maintain balanced
samples for all countries. As consequence, due to diﬀerent ﬁrm data coverage and
diﬀerent quality of the source data, the size of samples diﬀers signiﬁcantly across
countries. The poorest coverage of ﬁrms is for Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania
(from 150 to 190 ﬁrms). For Hungary and Estonia the ﬁrm coverage is only
slightly better (360 - 370 ﬁrms), while for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland,
Romania and Slovenia ﬁrm coverage is quite good (between 1100 and 1700 ﬁrms).
Insert Table 1
We dispose with the data on the share of foreign investors in total equity of
domestic ﬁrms. According to other studies, foreign ownership variable is con-
structed as a dummy variable Fi equal to 1 when the share of foreign equity
in total capital of a domestic ﬁrm exceeds 10 per cent, and zero otherwise. In
10addition, many theoretical papers on FDI claim that the extent of foreign own-
ership matters. Hence, an additional dummy variable Mi has been included into
the model in order to diﬀerentiate between minority and majority owned foreign
aﬃliates (Mi is equal to 1 when the share of foreign equity in total capital of a do-
mestic ﬁrm exceeds 50 per cent, and zero otherwise). This is to ﬁnd out whether
majority foreign ownership facilitates transfer of more complex technology and
managemnt skill to local ﬁrms.
Share of FIEs in total number of ﬁrms in our panels ranges between 3 and 30
per cent, with average foreign penetration amounting to 14 per cent. As revealed
in Table 1, the aggregate shares of FIEs in total employment of individual tran-
sition economies exceed the shares of FIEs in total number of ﬁrms by 70 per
cent on average. On the other side, the aggregate shares of FIEs in total sales
exceed their shares in total number of ﬁrms by threefold. This indicates that
FIEs are not only larger relative to domestic ﬁrms in terms of employment and
output, but also that FIEs are more more eﬃcient in terms of labor productivity.
In addition, breakdown of the above ﬁgures by individual manufacturing sectors
reveals greater concentration of FIEs in more capital and skill intensive sectors.
Another interesting fact can be seen from the ﬁgures on R&D accumulation by
foreign and domestic ﬁrms. It is a matter of fact that R&D activities are basi-
c a l l yc o n c e n t r a t e di nf o r e i g nﬁrms, with FIEs’ share in total R&D expenditure
amounting to 37 per cent. The only exception being probably Slovenia, where lo-
cal ﬁrms seem to lay emphasis on R&D accumulation in the same manner as FIEs
do. This may have important implications for the autonomous innovative ability
of domestic ﬁrms and their absorption capacity for potential R&D spillovers in
the economy in both groups of countries.
Data on input - output accounts stem from local statistical oﬃces. These
data conducted at NACE-2 digit level refer mainly to years 1996 or 1998. Un-
fortunately, these input - output tables are not available at a more disaggregated
level and for all years in our sample. This of course limits our potential to dis-
cover possible vertical spillovers as these are normally taking place at a lower
level of disaggregation as well as we are forced to exclude dynamic changes in the
structure of studied economies. However, there is nothing one can do about it.
4.2 Correction for sample selection bias
Having in mind the above discussed diﬀerences in characteristics between foreign
and domestic ﬁrms, one can argue that our panels of ﬁrm data might suﬀer
under selection bias. This is due to the fact that foreign investment decisions
are not randomly distributed but are probably subject to ﬁrms’ characteristics
and their initial performances. Hoekman and Djankov (2000) as well as Evenett
and Voicu (2001) claim that foreign investors tend to acquire shares in largest
and most successful domestic ﬁrms. For Slovenia, the opposite trends can be
claimed, where FDI are shown to be directed into less eﬀcient ﬁrms (see Rojec
11et al 2001). Hence, treating foreign and domestic ﬁrms as homogenous units
of observation will likely produce biased results due to possible endogeneity of
foreign investment decisions. We deal with this problem using the Heckman two-
step method proposed in Heckman (1979).2 In the Heckman procedure, the bias
that results from using non-randomly selected samples is dealt with as an ordinary
speciﬁcation bias arising due to omitted variables problem. Heckman proposes
to use estimated values of the omitted variables (which when omitted from the
model give rise to the speciﬁcation error) as regressors in the basic model. Hence,
in the ﬁr s ts t e pw ea c c o u n tf o rt h ep r o b a b i l i t ypi [ 0 ,1 ]t h a taﬁrm’s selection for
FDI is conditional on its initial structural characteristics before the take over.
The following probit equation has been estimated:
Pr(pit0 =1| Xi,jt0)=S (Xit0 6= Xjt0) (8)
where i and j (i =1 ,...,n, j =1 ,...,m) are indicating individual foreign and
domestic ﬁrm, respectively. The error terms are assumed to be IID and nor-
mally distributed, thus S(·) is a cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal distribution. Xi,jt0 is a matrix of ﬁrms’ structural characteristics in the
initial year. These are individual size, capital, skill and labor intensity, labor pro-
ductivity as well as industry characteristics, such as size of the industry. Due to
data limitation on ownership changes within the observed period, we are forced
to assume unchanged ownership over the whole period, whereby we took ﬁrms’
structural characteristics in the ﬁrst year of our sample as their initial charac-
teristics. In order to avoid autocorrelation, the ﬁrst year’s observation are then
excluded from the second stage estimations. The results of a ﬁrst stage probit
estimations contained in Table 2 do in fact conﬁrm the existence of selection bias
in our database. The results, however, do not conﬁr mt h eh y p o t h e s i st h a tM N C s
tend to acquire shares in largest and most successful local ﬁr m sa sp o i n t e do u tb y
Evenett and Voicu (2001) for Czech republic. Our results suggest that size and
labor productivity are not decisive ﬁrm’s characteristics considered by foreign
incestors. Size is not signiﬁcant in any of the analyzed countries, while labor pro-
ductivity is found to be a signiﬁcant determinant of foreign investment decisions
in only two countries. Instead, MNCs were found to tend to acquire more capital
and skill intensive ﬁrms, which is conﬁrmed for 7 out of 10 transition countries.
On the other side, the tendency of foreign investors to cluster in industries with
already high foreign penetration in terms of foreign ownership is conﬁrmed for
all of the ten economies. This pattern of clustering in speciﬁc industries might
well be the reason in previous studies for failing to ﬁnd signiﬁcant horizontal
spillovers. This, in turn, may also lead to signiﬁcant backward spillovers if FIEs
create strong demand for intermediates of other vertically linked industries.
2Problem of sample selection bias has been extensively dealt with in the econometric liter-
ature (see also Amemiya 1984 and Wooldridge 2002 for excellent surveys of the literature and
correction methods).
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Based on these probit results, the so-called inverse Mill’s ratios, Λi, for all ob-
servations (for non-zero as well as zero observations regarding foreign investment
choices) are calculated. A vector of Λi is then included in our second step esti-
mations as an additional independent variable which controls for the unobserved
impacts of foreign investment decisions.
4.3 Econometric approach
To analyze the impact of diﬀerent channels of technology transfer on ﬁrm’s total
factor productivity (TFP) we estimate growth model (2) augmented by ﬁrm’s
technology structure (3). Using OLS approach to estimate the ﬁrm’s productiv-
ity, however, is inappropriate as inputs kit, lit and nit are probably determined
endogenously by ﬁrm’s past productivity (see Grilliches and Mairesse 1995). The
OLS estimator is unbiased and consistent only when all explanatory variables
are exogenous. This, however, is not the case in our model due to possible en-
dogeneity between productivity and investments into inputs. Note that so far,
with the exception of Smarzynska (2001), Konings (2002) and the present study,
none of the studies on spillovers has taken this endogeneity problem explicitly
into account. There are basically two common methods used for correcting for
this endogeneity problem. Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest to use semiparametric
estimation of production function in order to obtain consistent parameters on
inputs. Smarzynska (2001) has recently applied this approach to the Lithuanian
data. Another approach is suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991, 1988), Arel-
lano and Bover (1995) as well as Blundell and Bond (1998, 1999), who suggest
to estimate a dynamic version of the production function and then correct for
endogeneity using general method of moments (GMM) in a dynamic panel data
framework. Konnings (2002) has recently used a diﬀerence GMM estimation
approach to ﬁrm level data on Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. In the present
paper we use a system GMM estimator suggested recently by Blundell and Bond
(1998, 1999), which proved to be more eﬃcient compared to the diﬀerence GMM
estimator.
I nw h a tf o l l o w sw eu s et h eB l u n d e l la n dB o n d( 1 9 9 9 )a p p r o a c h ,a c c o r d i n gt o
w h i c ho u rg r o w t hm o d e l( 2 ) ,c a nb er e w r i t t e ni ne c o n o m e t r i cf o r ma s :
yit = αkit + βlit + γnit + tit + δt +( ηi + νit + mit) (9)
with the assumption about the error term:
νit = ρνit−1 + eit
eit,m it ∼ MA(0)
13where t is a productivity (technology) shock as speciﬁed in (3), and δt is a year
speciﬁc intercept. The error term is decomposed into ηi w h i c hi sa nu n o b s e r v e d
ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀect, νit is an autoregressive (productivity) shock, and mit repre-
sents serially uncorrelated measurement error. Note that both labor l, capital k
and intermediates n are potentially correlated with ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects ηi as well
as with both productivity shocks eit and measurement errors mit.
As argued above the model (9) captures dynamic processes in the ﬁrm as in-
puts are probably determined endogenously by ﬁrm’s past productivity, and vice
versa. The time dimension of panel data enable us to capture these dynamics of
adjustment directly by inclusion of lagged dependent as well as lagged indepen-
dent variables. Hence, a dynamic version of the growth model (9) can then be
written as:
yit = ρyit−1 + αkit − ραkit−1 + βlit − ρβlit−1 + γnit − ργnit−1 (10)
+(θtit − ρθtit−1)+( δt − ρδt−1)+ηi(1 − ρ)+eit +( mit − ρmit−1)
In the above speciﬁcation of the model we deal with the perfect simultaneity
as not only present and lagged dependent variables are correlated, but also lagged
dependent variable (sales) are assumed to be correlated with present independent
variables (inputs), and vice versa. Applying OLS estimator to the model spec-
iﬁcation (10) would inevitably lead to inconsistent and biased coeﬃcients. The
OLS estimator is unbiased and consistent when all explanatory variables are ex-
ogenous and are uncorrelated with the individual speciﬁce ﬀects. This, however,
is not the case in our model, which includes lagged variables. One can show that
the OLS estimator will be seriously biased due to correlation of the lagged depen-
dent variable with the individual speciﬁce ﬀects as well as with the independent
variables. This is due to the fact that yit is a function of ηi in (9), and then
yit−1 is also a function of ηi. As a consequence, yit−1 is correlated with the error
term, which renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent, even if the νit
and mit in (9) are not serially correlated. This holds also whether the individual
eﬀects are considered ﬁxed or random (see Hsiao 1986, Baltagi 1995, Wooldridge
2002). There are several ways of controlling for this unobserved heterogeneity
and simultaneity. One way is to include exogenous variables into the ﬁrst-order
autoregressive process. This, in turn, reduces the bias in the OLS estimator, but
its magnitude still remains positive. Another way of controlling for the simul-
taneity is to apply the Anderson-Hsiao instrumental variable approach. We may
ﬁrst-diﬀerentiate our model (9) in order to eliminate ηi,w h i c hi st h es o u r c eo f
the bias in the OLS estimator. Then we may take the second lag of the level
yit−2 and the ﬁrst diﬀerence of this second lag ∆yit−2 as possible instruments for
∆yit−1, since both are correlated with it (∆yit−1 = yit−1−yit−2) but uncorrelated
with the error term ∆uit (= uit−uit−1). This approach, though consistent, is not
eﬃc i e n ts i n c ei td o e sn o tt a k ei n t oa c c o u n ta l lt h ea v a i l a b l em o m e n tc o n d i t i o n s
(i.e. restrictions on the covariances between regressors and the error term).
14Hence, a natural choice of approach that allows for controlling for the unob-
served heterogeneity and simultaneity in (10) is the application of GMM (general
method of moments) estimators. There are two possible choices of application
of the GMM approach to dynamic panel data. Diﬀerence GMM (diﬀ-GMM)
method uses lagged levels as instruments for ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equation. How-
ever, as shown by Arellano and Bover (1995), lagged level instruments used in
diﬀ-GMM approach are weak instruments for ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equation. Arellano
and Bond (1998), and Blundell and Bond (1998, 1999) suggest that an applica-
tion of the system GMM (sys-GMM) estimators is a more appropriate approach
to dynamic panel data than using diﬀ-GMM estimators. If model is estimated
in ﬁrst diﬀerences, corresponding instruments for ∆xi3 are xi1 and ∆xi1 (where
x stands generally for all included variables), and so on for higher time periods.
This approach allows for a larger set of lagged levels’ and ﬁrst-diﬀerences’ in-
struments and therefore to exploit fully all of the available moment conditions.
Hence, the system GMM approach maximizes both the consistency as well as the
eﬃciency of the applied estimator. The only drawback of the sys-GMM approach
to dynamic panel data is that either balanced panel data or longer time series
are required since the ﬁrst two years of observations are used up as instruments.
5R e s u l t s
In this section we ﬁrst present estimation results on direct eﬀects as well as
horizontal and vertical spillovers from FDI obtained from the sample of foreign
aﬃliates and local ﬁrms. In the second step we then account for the innovation
capability and absorption capacity of local ﬁrms for taking advantage of the
spillovers that are around in the economy.
In our ﬁrst model we account for direct eﬀects as well as horizontal and vertical
spillovers from FDI. In eﬀect, combining (10) and (3), we estimate following
empirical model as our model 1:
yit = ρyit−1 + αkit − ραkit−1 + βlit − ρβlit−1 + γnit − ργnit−1 (11)
+πFikit − ρπFikit−1 + ψFilit − ρψFilit−1 + ωFinit − ρωFinit−1
+κFi + µMi + εESit + χHSit + υVS
B
it
+λΛit +( δt − ρδt−1)+eit +( mit − ρmit−1)
Our model (11) is estimated in log ﬁrst diﬀerences in order to obtain esti-
mates of coeﬃcients on ﬁrm’s TFP growth as well as to eliminate unobserved
ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects ηi. As it can be seen from equation (11), our empirical model
includes among dependent variables also the interaction terms Fitkit, Fitlit and
Fitnit in order to control for diﬀerent eﬃciency of FIEs in utilizing their resources.
15A vector of inverse Mill’s ratios Λi is included as an additional independent vari-
able which controls for the unobserved impacts of foreign investment decisions.
The model is estimated on a set of foreign aﬃliates and domestic ﬁrms. In econo-
metric estimations we apply sys-GMM approach, which in addition to lagged
levels uses also lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerences as instruments for equations in levels.
Before we turn to the estimation results a few words should be spent on the
scope for horizontal as well vertical spillovers. Previous studies mainly failed to
ﬁnd evidence on horizontal spillovers. There are several possible reasons for these
unsatisfactory results. First reason is substantial as, obviously, MNCs might be
very eﬀective in protecting their technology advantages and so preventing from
potential spillovers. hence, there is in fact no scope for spillovers to local ﬁrms in
the same industry. Another reason may lie in the empirical approach applied so
far. All of the studies account for horizontal spillovers by applying linear relation-
ship between foreign penetration of the industry (in terms of total sales of foreign
aﬃliates) and productivity growth of local ﬁrms in that industry. One may ar-
gue, however, that there is a non-linear relation between the two. In other words,
one may emphasize that with low foreign penetration of the industry the scope
for horizontal spillovers are low but increasing as foreign penetration increases.
After some point foreign penetration of the industry might start dampening the
activities of local ﬁrms, which cannot compete with foreign aﬃliates any more
and are forced to exit. This argumentation leads to an inverted U-shaped re-
lationship between foreign penetration and horizontal spillovers, which in turn
cannot be assessed correctly by applying linear estimators. Even if there is in
fact a correlation between foreign penetration and horizontal spillovers, linear
estimation techniques cannot take account of it.
Figure 1 shows the actual relationships between foreign penetration measured
at the NACE-2 digit level (horizontal axis) and the average growth of ﬁrms in the
analysed period (vertical axis) in ten transition economies. From these ﬁgures
one clearly see that the above discussion does not necessarily apply to transition
economies as there is revealed no much scope for horizontal spillovers. If any, the
estimated impact of horizontal spillovers on local ﬁrms’ TFP growth should be
very low.
Insert Figure 1
On the other side, one may expect a much larger scope for backward vertical
spillovers as strong foreign penetration of a particular industry, at least, does
n o tc r o w do u tl o c a lﬁrm in other industries. Hence, a monotonic positive rela-
tionship between purchases by foreign aﬃliates and TFP growth of local ﬁrms
in vertically linked industries is expected. Figure 2, indeed, reveal some scope
for positive backward vertical linkages in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania and Slovenia.
Insert Figure 2
16The results of estimations of the model (11) do conﬁrm above speculations.
The results can be summarized into four basic ﬁndings. First, in 5 transition
countries FDI were found to be an important vehicle of direct technology transfer
to domestic ﬁrms. In Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia foreign aﬃliates grow much
faster in terms of TFP as compared to local ﬁrms, while in Lithuania and Romania
faster productivity growth is accounted in the majority owned foreign aﬃlates
only. Surprisingly, in Czech Republic and Poland foreig aﬃliates are shown to lag
behind their domestic counterparts. Second, on the contrary to our expectations,
signiﬁcant (though fairly low) positive horizontal spillovers to domestic ﬁrms are
revealed in Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. In Bulgaria only
foreign aﬃliates are aﬀected by these positive horizontal spillovers. It should
go without saying that in none of the analyzed countries foreign aﬃliates are
shown to exhibit signiﬁcant crowding out eﬀects for domestic ﬁrms. Third, in
accordance to Figure 2, evidence on positive backward vertical spillovers is found
in Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. In Bulgaria, only foreign aﬃliates can
accrue for these backward spillovers, while in Lithuania and Latvia even negative
backward spillovers for for foreign aﬃliates are detected. The latter ﬁnding might
well be caused by very poor coverage of ﬁrms for these countries in our database.
Four, direct FDI eﬀects provide by far the most important productivity spillover
for local ﬁr m s ,w h i c hi so na v e r a g eb ys o m ef a c t o r5 0l a r g e rt h a nt h ei m p a c to f
backward linkages of FDI and by factor 500 larger than the impact of horizontal
spillovers.
Insert Table 3
In our second model we account for the innovation capability and absorption
capacity of local ﬁr m sf o rt a k i n ga d v a n t a g eo ft h es p i l l o v e r st h a ta r ea r o u n di n
the economy. In doing this, the model (11) has to be rewritten:
yit = ρyit−1 + αkit − ραkit−1 + βlit − ρβlit−1 + γnit − ργnit−1 (12)
+φRDit − ρφRDit−1 + χHSit + θHSitRDit + υVS
B
it + τVS
B
itRDit
+εESit +( δt − ρδt−1)+eit +( mit − ρmit−1)
Model (12) is estimated on a sample of local ﬁrms only. In order to account
for the innovation capability of local ﬁrms present and lagged RDit variables are
included. The interaction terms HSitRDit and VS B
itRDit are included in order
to account for the absorption capacity of local ﬁrms. Econometric approach is
t h es a m ea sa b o v e .Ag r e a tp o r t i o no fc a u t i o s n e s si sn e e d e dw h e nw ei n t e r p r e t e
the estimation results of this model. Data on ﬁrms’ R&D stocks consist of the
intangible assets variable contained in the ﬁrms’ balance sheets. These variable,
however, do not look very promising since it includes only a small portion of
actual R&D investment of individual ﬁrms. In fact, the largest portion of R&D
investments is contained in the material cost.
17Insert Table 4
The results obtained by estimating (12) do not conﬁrm the empahisized role
of the innovation capability and absorption capacity of local ﬁrms in transition
economies. Innovation capability as a source of ﬁrm’s own TFP growth is shown
to be important in least developed transition economies, such as Lithuania, Latvia
and Romania, while in Hungary only lagged R&D investment seem to contribute
to ﬁrm’s TFP growth. Similarly, absorption capacity of local ﬁrms to take advan-
tage of the spillovers is found to be important only in Slovakia, while in Estonia,
Hungary and Latvia it is revealed to be even an obstacle to accumulation of
potential horizontal spillovers of FDI. In terms of backward vertical spillovers,
the absorption capacity of ﬁr m sd o e sn o ts e e mt oh a v ea ne ﬀect on their TFP
growth. The only exception being local ﬁrms in Slovenia and Romania, where
higher absorption capacity tend to decrease the scope for accumulation of vertical
spillovers from FDI. As discussed above, our failure to ﬁnd some impact of the
innovation capability and absorption capacity of local ﬁrms on their TFP growth
might well be driven by the poor quality of the data on R&D at the ﬁrm level.
On the other side, a study of Alverez et al (2002), which took account of the
whole set of ﬁrms’ actual technology measures stemming from national innova-
tion surveys for Spain, also failed to ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlation between ﬁrm’s
innovation capability and its TFP growth as well between its absorption capacity
and spillover eﬀects.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The main objective of this paper is to provide a comparative study on importance
of spillovers through FDI on a set of comparable countries by using a common
methodology and up-to-date dynamic panel data techniques. This is the way how
to achieve comparability of the results and to provide a credible insight into the
importance of diﬀerent channels of international technology transfer for ﬁrms in
transition countries. In order to do this, the study diﬀerentiate between direct
eﬀects of FDI from the parent ﬁrm to local aﬃliates as well as horizontal vertical
spillovers from foreign aﬃliates to domestically owned local ﬁrms. To calcu-
late horizontal and vertical spillovers and to diﬀerentiate between backward and
forward vertical linkages we use the methodology developed by Blalock (2001)
and Damijan and Knell (2002). The importance of these diﬀerent channels of
technology transfer is then estimated in the framework of growth accounting ap-
proach using the unique ﬁrm level database consisting of some 8,000 ﬁrms for
ten advanced transition countries in the period 1995-1999. Due to the simulta-
nenity problem that typically arises in growth accounting approach estimated in
the panel data framework, we make use of the recently developed econometric
methods for dealing with dynamic panel data. Hence, we estimate augmented
18production function at the ﬁrm level using system general method of moments
(sys-GMM) approach. In addition, we correct for potential selection bias that
arises due to possibly endogenous foreign investment decisions using a generalized
Heckman two-step procedure. We ﬁnd that direct FDI eﬀects are signiﬁcant in
ﬁve out of ten examined transition countries and that they provide by far the
most important productivity spillover for local ﬁrms. Direct eﬀects of FDI are
found to provide on average an impact on ﬁrm’s productivity that is larger by
some factor 50 than the impact of backward linkages and by factor 500 larger
than the impact of horizontal spillovers. On the other hand, vertical spillovers
p r o v i d ea ni m p a c to nﬁrm’s productivity that is higher by factor 10 relative to
horizontal spillovers. These results speak in favor of the larger importance of
vertical versus horizontal spillovers from FDI.
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Figure 1: Scope for horizontal spillovers -FIEs' penetration of 
industries and firms' average growth) 
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 Figure 2: Scope for vertical spillovers - 
Backward linkages by FIEs and firms' average growth) 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for foreign vs. domestic manufacturing firms in 1999 
 
   BG CZ  EST*  HU LT LV PL RO SK  SLO Avg. 
No. of all firms  1334  1168 373 360 171 194 1540  1711 151  1093 810 
No. of FIEs  95 191 108  84  6  36 198 289 9 118 113 
% of  FIEs in no. firms  7.1 16.4 29.0 23.3  3.5 18.6 12.9 16.9 6.0 10.8 14.4 
% of  FIEs in sales  26.6 62.3 92.1 96.4  9.1 51.7 53.3 30.9 8.5 38.0 46.9 
% of  FIEs in emp.  15.2 30.0 56.0 48.9  3.4 31.6 18.8 19.4 6.2 17.3 24.7 
% of  FIEs in R&D   33.7 34.8 90.1 36.9 18.0 19.0 56.5 32.1 32.7 14.5 36.8 
wage FIE / wage DE  1.73 1.34 1.41 1.31 1.00 1.00 0.74 1.21 1.25 1.16 1.22 
* 1998 for Estonia   
  
 
Table 2: Heckman two-stage sample selection: Probability of foreign investment decisions in 1995 
  (Results of probit model)
   BG CZ EST#  HU LT  LV  PL RO SK  SLO
Size  -1.8E-07 1.2E-06 -3.4E-05 8.7E-07 -7.0E-05  8.1E-06  -1.8E-10 8.3E-07 -2.3E-06  3.7E-0
  z-stat.  (-0.080) (1.255) (-1.627) (0.440) (-0.460)  (0.350)  (0.000) (0.490) (-0.540)  (1.294
Capital intensity  *0.019  *0.003 ***0.024  *-0.004 0.018  **0.072 ***0.009 **0.008 0.004 -0.00
  z-stat.  (1.854) (2.180) (3.457)  (-1.856) (0.509)  (2.503)  (5.201) (2.231) (0.222)  (-0.70
Skill intensity  **0.216  -0.015 0.080  *0.038    -0.017 -0.056  **0.02
  z-stat.  (2.252) (-1.237) (1.002)  (1.769)      (-0.457) (-1.135)  (2.436
Labor productivity  -0.001 -0.001 ***0.015  0.001 -0.004 0.006 0.000  *0.002 -0.009 7.2E-0
  z-stat.  (-0.218)  (-0.784) (2.648) (1.531) (-0.079)  (0.759)  (-0.363) (1.667) (-0.253)  (0.154
Sector size  **0.036  0.015 0.002 0.018 0.005  0.007  0.011  -0.004 ***0.037  -0.00
  z-stat.  (2.210) (1.589) (0.250) (1.581) (0.119)  (0.262)  (0.973)  (-0.206) (4.447)  (-0.584
Foreign  penetration  ***0.024 ***0.023 ***0.012 ***0.026 **0.050  ***0.031  ***0.021 ***0.025 ***-0.026  ***0.02
  z-stat.  (10.835) (13.518) (3.347)  (8.538) (2.539)  (5.783)  (11.736) (13.521) (-4.056)  (8.488
Number of obs.  1334 1168 373  360 171  194  1540 1711 151  109
Pseudo R2  0.281 0.232 0.146 0.358 0.336  0.453  0.230 0.162 0.623  0.14
# 1994 for Estonia and Slovenia   Table 3: Impact of FDI: Direct effects and spillovers (Test 1) 
(Sample of domestic and foreign owned firms) 
Test1            BG CZ EST HU LT LV PL RO SK SLO
FDI dummy  -0.027  ***-0.126    **0.162 *0.070 ***-0.544 -0.001 ***-0.091 *-0.050  0.047 **0.052 
  (-0.99)         
   
(-3.82) (2.50) (1.73) (-2.69) (-0.01) (-2.92) (-1.70) (0.81) (2.12)
Majority FDI  0.013 0.002 **0.041 0.002 ***0.492  0.015 -0.001 **0.015  0.004 -0.002 
  (1.07)         
   
(0.20) (2.16) (0.14) (4.82) (0.76) (-0.25) (2.48) (0.26) (-0.37)
Hor_Spill  0.0001  ***0.0003  -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0001 **0.0002 ***0.0003 *0.0006 0.00004 
  (0.69)         
         
(2.67) (-1.35) (1.60) (-1.24) (-0.41) (2.09) (3.02) (1.87) (0.98)
Hor_Spill_FDI *0.0007  0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0076 0.0002 0.000002 0.0002 0.0003 -0.00001
  (1.79)         
   
(1.40) (0.25) (0.89) (-0.86) (0.37) (0.02) (1.55) (0.63) (-0.08)
Backward_Spill  -0.001  ***0.003  -0.001 -0.003 0.032 0.002 **0.002 0.001 0.010 **0.001 
  (-0.94)         
           
(2.65) (-0.59) (-1.31) (1.40) (1.25) (2.29) (0.83) (0.29) (2.21)
Backward_Spill_FDI ***0.009 0.002 0.002 0.000 *-0.984 ***-0.013 0.002 0.000 -0.053 -0.002
  (2.59)         
   
(0.60) (0.90) (0.01) (-1.83) (-2.74) (0.63) (0.11) (-1.28) (-0.94)
Forward_Spill  -0.001  ***-0.005  0.001 0.004 -0.006 -0.004 ***-0.005 0.000 -0.008 *-0.001 
  (-1.59)         
           
(-3.64) (0.30) (1.17) (-0.25) (-1.50) (-3.85) (0.36) (-0.26) (-1.71)
Forward_Spill_FDI **-0.009 0.000 -0.001 0.001 *0.970 **0.013 0.001 0.001 0.032 0.001
  (-2.45)         
     
(-0.07) (-0.46) (0.18) (1.68) (2.33) (0.26) (0.32) (0.77) (0.55)
Sector size  0.0003 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0002 0.0002  ***-0.002 0.00001 
  (0.81)         
   
(0.19) (-0.77) (-1.52) (-1.40) (-1.58) (-0.73) (0.58) (-3.21) (0.20)
Sector size_FDI  **-0.0041  *-0.0014  0.0009 **-0.0035 *0.0320  -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0001 0.0004 0.00003
  (-2.10)         
         
(-1.67) (0.66) (-2.25) (1.70) (-0.20) (-1.29) (-0.09) (0.14) (0.28)
No. of obs.  4123 3985 1047 760 422 555 4271 6018 426 5170
AR(1)  -10.62         
         
-5.68 -6.28 -2.31 -2.71 -2.63 -7.37 -10.82 -2.05 -10.20
AR(2)  0.08 -0.40 - - 1.30 0.17 0.26 -1.68 -0.80 0.55
 Table 4: Impact of R&D: Importance of innovative and absorptive capacity (Test 2) 
(Sample of domestic firms only) 
Test2            BG CZ EST HU LT LV PL RO SK SLO
R&D  0.021        0.001 -0.006 -0.005 *0.115 ***0.015 0.000 *0.009 **-0.011 -0.002 
  (0.98)         
       
(1.60) (-0.40) (-1.48) (1.88) (2.98) (0.21) (1.70) (-2.09) (-0.92)
R&D(-1)  -0.024 -0.001 0.017 *0.016  -0.069 *-0.011 0.000 -0.009 0.009 0.005
  (-1.05)         
       
(-1.60) (0.67) (1.68) (-0.82) (-1.82) (-0.10) (-1.57) (1.49) (1.46)
Hor_Spill  -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.00004 0.0001 **0.0001  -0.0004 0.0001
  (-0.79)         
 
(-0.81) (0.21) (0.32) (-1.45) (-0.21) (1.57) (2.45) (-1.05) (1.41)
Hor_Spill_R&D  4.6E-05 -2.8E-07 **-0.0001 **5.4E-05  3.3E-04 *-5E-06 4.9E-06 4.3E-07  **0.0004  -3.8E-06 
  (1.24)         
     
(-0.55) (-2.24) (2.18) (0.75) (-1.80) (0.59) (0.56) (2.31) (-0.51)
Backward_Spill  -0.001  ***0.004 -0.001 -0.0002 0.014 0.002 **0.002 0.0004 -0.009 ***0.002 
  (-1.18)         
   
(2.74) (-0.58) (-0.06) (0.54) (0.84) (2.28) (0.59) (-0.34) (2.95)
Backward_Spill_R&D  -0.0004 0.00001 0.0002 -0.0004 0.010 0.0001 0.00002 *-0.0001  -0.002  **-0.0002 
  (-0.86)         
     
(0.50) (0.46) (-0.76) (0.47) (0.71) (0.16) (-1.83) (-0.86) (-2.06)
Forward_Spill  -0.001  ***-0.005 0.002 0.003 0.012 -0.002 ***-0.005 0.001 0.006 *-0.001 
  (-1.22)         
       
(-3.40) (0.98) (0.76) (0.52) (-0.67) (-4.02) (1.01) (0.24) (-1.89)
Forward_Spill_R&D  0.0003 -0.00001 0.00003 -0.00002 -0.014 *-0.0002 -0.0001 *0.0001  0.005 0.0001
  (1.02)         
   
(-0.49) (0.09) (-0.06) (-0.64) (-1.69) (-0.61) (1.71) (1.31) (1.28)
Sector size  0.0001 -0.0004 -0.001 ***-0.002 **-0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.0001  ***-0.003  -0.00001 
  (0.18)         
         
(-1.44) (-0.82) (-2.62) (-2.11) (-1.23) (-1.62) (0.34) (-4.45) (-0.40)
Sector size_R&D  0.0001 2.5E-08 -0.0005 -3.2E-05 -0.0006 *-0.0001 **0.0001 3.3E-05 -2.8E-05 9.8E-07
  (0.46)         
         
(0.61) (-0.85) (-0.31) (-1.63) (-1.77) (2.28) (0.98) (-0.94) (0.33)
No. of obs.  3820 3308 759 583 411 438 3712 5075 398 4633
AR(1)  -9.99         
         
-4.49 -4.91 -2.72 -2.73 -3.36 -7.71 -8.94 -1.79 -9.69
AR(2)  0.44 -0.17 - - 1.30 0.61 -1.00 -1.82 -1.27 0.54
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